Ukrainian forces blow a bridge south of Pokrovsk.
Ukrainian defense ministry capture
On the shell-pocked battleground of eastern Ukraine, Russia has one main goal: to fully occupy the coal-rich Donbas region. That means capturing Luhansk Oblast and neighboring Donetsk Oblast, together representing around 10 percent of Ukraine’s area.
Luhansk fell early in the war. But 34 months after Russia launched what was supposed to be a days-long invasion of Ukraine, its forces hold just two-thirds of Donetsk. And near-term prospects for a full occupation of the oblast are dimming.
There are two main obstacles: the Ukrainian fortress city of Pokrovsk and, 25 miles to the northeast, a whole chain of fortress cities stretching from Kostyantynivka to Sloviansk.
“By the end of the current year, the enemy will not succeed in seizing the ‘belt of fortresses’—Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka-Kramatorsk-Sloviansk—or occupying Donetsk Oblast,” the Ukrainian Center for Defense Strategies predicted.
That doesn’t mean the Russians aren’t advancing. In recent weeks, elements of the Russian army’s 90th Guards Tank Division advanced through the village of Zhovte to nearby Novopushtynka, creating a narrow but miles-deep salient in Ukrainian lines that places the Russian vanguard just five miles south of Pokrovsk.
If the Russians aim to surround and cut off Pokrovsk rather than directly attack it—and there’s ample evidence that’s the plan—the recent advance is key. The next logical move for the 90th Guards Tank Division and adjacent units would be to widen the salient by capturing Novotroitske and, farther south, Ukrainka.
In addition to squeezing Pokrovsk, a wider salient would serve a secondary purpose for Russian forces: threatening the supply lines of Ukrainian forces in and around Zorya and Sontsivka, south of the salient. Since ejecting the Ukrainian army’s weary 72nd Mechanized Brigade from Vuhledar on Oct. 1, the Russians have advanced at a slow but steady clip in southern Donetsk.
The developing Russian encirclement of Pokrovsk from the south could double as a Russian encirclement of southern Donetsk from the north.
The Russian salient south of Pokrovsk.
Ukraine Control Map
But it’s not clear the Russians have the resources to pull off the maneuver. With their best troops and equipment, not to mention thousands of North Korean reinforcements, busy battling the Ukrainian invasion of western Russia’s Kursk Oblast—and suffering horrific casualties—the Russians have few reserves around Pokrovsk.
“Over the past two to three months, in order to advance on the Pokrovsk direction, the enemy’s command has had to maintain high operational troop density not by reinforcements but by regrouping existing forces,” CDS explained.
We should find out soon whether the Russians possess the combat power to capture Pokrovsk. “The upcoming battle for Pokrovsk will mark the apex of the enemy’s offensive operation” for 2024, CDS concluded.
The Russians aren’t approaching the city from a position of great strength. Monthly troop losses exceed—by many thousands—the number of fresh troops the Kremlin recruits every month. Stocks of modern tanks and fighting vehicles are running low, compelling more Russians to attack in pickup trucks and vans.
At the same time, the swift collapse of Bashar Al-Assad’s brutal regime in Syria this week stranded thousands of Russian troops and substantial amounts of modern equipment at a handful of bases along the Syrian coast—and embarrassed Russian President Vladimir Putin at exactly the moment Putin should be projecting strength and confidence for the troops preparing to attack Pokrovsk.
The environment could change, however—and soon. The coming new year could bring sweeping changes to the politics of the Russia-Ukraine war. U.S. President-elect Donald Trump will usher in a chaotic and unpredictable new administration in the United States—one that could end or greatly reduce vital U.S. aid to Ukraine. Germany will hold federal elections. France may get a new government, too.
Maybe the shifting politics will hurt Ukraine and help Russia. Maybe they’ll do the opposite. The uncertainty is surely palpable in Moscow and Kyiv. The difference, however, is that Moscow is trying to sustain a costly offensive in pursuit of goals that keep slipping farther into the future. By contrast, Ukraine’s main goal is to simply survive while Russia expends people, weapons and time it can’t get back.
